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DEGREASING THEWHEELS OF FINANCE∗
BY ALEKSANDER BERENTSEN, SAMUEL HUBER, AND ALESSANDRO MARCHESIANI1
University of Basel, Switzerland and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S.A.; University of
Basel, Switzerland; University of Minho, Portugal
Can there be too much trading in financial markets? We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model, where
agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. A financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid
assets in response to these shocks. The optimal policy is to restrict access to this market because portfolio choices
exhibit a pecuniary externality: Agents do not take into account that by holding more of the liquid asset, they not only
acquire additional insurance against these liquidity shocks, but also marginally increase the value of the liquid asset,
which improves insurance for other market participants.
1. INTRODUCTION
Policymakers sometimes propose and implementmeasures that prevent agents from readjust-
ing their portfolios frequently. Cases in point are holding periods or differential tax treatments,
where capital gains taxes depend on the holding period of an asset. Such policies raise a basic
question: Can it be optimal to increase frictions in financial markets in order to reduce the
frequency of trading? Or, to phrase this question differently: Can the frequency at which agents
trade in financial markets be too high from a societal point of view?
The main message of our article is that restricting access to financial markets can be welfare-
improving. At first, this result seems to be counterintuitive: How can it be possible that agents
are better off in a less flexible environment? The reason for this result is that in our environment
the portfolio choices of agents exhibit a pecuniary externality. This externality can be so strong
that the optimal policy response is to reduce the frequency at which agents can trade in financial
markets; that is, we provide an example of an environment where degreasing the wheels of
finance is optimal.
We derive this result in a dynamic general equilibriummodel with two nominal assets: a liquid
asset and an illiquid asset.2 By liquid (illiquid), we mean that the asset can be used (cannot
be used) as a medium of exchange in goods market trades.3 Agents face idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks, which generate an ex post inefficiency in that some agents have “idle” liquidity holdings,
whereas others are liquidity constrained in the goods market. This inefficiency generates an
∗Manuscript received September 2011; revised December 2012.
1 We would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. We also thank seminar
participants at the Bank of International Settlements, the BI Norwegian Business School, the 2012 Cycles, Adjustment,
and Policy Conference on Credit, Unemployment, Supply and Demand, and Frictions, Aarhus (Denmark), and the
2012 Midwest Macroeconomic Meetings, Notre Dame (USA). The views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the
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+41(0)612671205. E-mail: aleksander.berentsen@unibas.ch.
2 Our basic framework is the divisible money model developed in Lagos and Wright (2005). The main departure
from this framework is that we add government bonds and a secondary bond market, where agents can trade bonds for
money after experiencing an i.i.d. liquidity shock.
3 We call an asset that can be exchanged for consumption goods liquid and one that cannot be exchanged illiquid.
In our model, the liquid asset is fiat money and the illiquid asset is a one-period government bond. The fact that
government bonds cannot be used as a medium of exchange to acquire consumption goods is the consequence of
certain assumptions that we impose on our environment as explained in the main discourse of this article.
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endogenous role for a financial market, where agents can trade the liquid for the illiquid asset
before trading in the goods market. We show that restricting (but not eliminating) access to this
market can be welfare-improving.
The basic mechanism generating this result is as follows: The financial market exerts two
effects. On the one hand, by reallocating the liquid asset to those agents who have an immediate
need for it, it provides insurance against the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. On the other hand,
by insuring agents against the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, it reduces the demand for the liquid
asset ex ante and thus decreases its value. This effect can be so strong that it dominates the
benefits provided by the financial market in reallocating liquidity.
In a sense made precise in the article, the financial market allows market participants to free-
ride on the liquidity holdings of other participants. An agent does not take into account that
by holding more of the liquid asset he not only acquires additional insurance against his own
idiosyncratic liquidity risks, but he also marginally increases the value of the liquid asset, which
improves insurance for other market participants. This pecuniary externality can be corrected
by restricting, but not eliminating, access to this financial market.
Our framework is related to the literature that studies the societal benefits of illiquid govern-
ment bonds, which started with Kocherlakota’s (2003) observation that if government money
and government bonds are equally liquid, they should trade at par, since the latter constitutes a
risk-free nominal claim against future money. In practice, though, government bonds trade at a
discount, indicating that they are less liquid than money.4 Kocherlakota’s surprising answer to
this observation is that it is socially beneficial that bonds are illiquid. The intuition for this result
is that a bond that is as liquid as money is a perfect substitute for money and hence redundant,
or in the words of Kocherlakota (2003, p. 184): “If bonds are as liquid as money, then people
will only hold money if nominal interest rates are zero. But then the bonds can just be replaced
by money: there is no difference between the two instruments at all.”
Kocherlakota (2003) derives this result in a model where agents receive a one-time i.i.d.
liquidity shock after they choose their initial portfolio of money and illiquid bonds. After
experiencing the shock, agents trade money for bonds in a secondary bond market. Many
aspects of our environment are similar to Kocherlakota (2003). However, our key result is
different and novel. We show that it is not only optimal that bonds are illiquid, but that one
needs to go one step further: It can be efficient to restrict the ability of agents to trade them for
money in a secondary bond market.5
Our article is also related to the macroeconomic literature that studies the implications of
pecuniary externalities for welfare (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2008;
Bianchi and Mendoza, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011; Korinek, 2012). In this literature, the
fundamental friction is limited commitment; that is, agents have a limited ability to commit to
future repayments. Due to this friction, borrowing requires collateral. A pecuniary externality
arises, because agents do not take into account how their borrowing decisions affect collateral
prices, and through them the borrowing constraints of other agents. As a consequence, the
equilibrium is characterized by overborrowing, which is defined as “the difference between the
amount of credit that an agent obtains acting atomistically in an environment with a given set
of credit frictions, and the amount obtained by a social planner who faces the same frictions
but internalizes the general-equilibrium effects of its borrowing decisions” (see Bianchi and
Mendoza, 2011, p. 1).6
4 According to Andolfatto (2011, p. 133), the illiquidity of bonds “is commonly explained by the fact that bonds
possess physical or legal characteristics that render them less liquid than money ... which raises the question of what
purpose it might serve to issue two nominally risk-free assets, with one intentionally handicapped (hence discounted)
relative to the other.”
5 Some other papers that study the societal benefits of illiquid bonds are Shi (2008), Andolfatto (2011), and Berentsen
and Waller (2011). All these papers show, among other things, that Kocherlakota’s result holds in a steady-state
equilibrium aswell.We presentmore details of the Shi (2008) framework and compare it to ourmodel andKocherlakota
(2003) in Section 7.
6 Related to this literature are studies on financial accelerators (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997) or endogenous borrowing constraints (e.g., Kehoe and Levine, 1993; Berentsen et al., 2007).
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This pecuniary externality effect has been used to study credit booms and busts. In a model
with competitive financial contracts and aggregate shocks, Lorenzoni (2008) identifies exces-
sive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. In Bianchi andMendoza (2011), cyclical
dynamics lead to a period of credit expansion up to the point where the collateral constraint
becomes binding, followed by sharp decreases in credit, asset prices, and macroeconomic ag-
gregates (see alsoMendoza and Smith, 2006; Mendoza, 2010). Jeanne and Korinek (2011) study
the optimal policy involved in credit booms and busts. They find that it is optimal to impose
cyclical taxes to prevent agents from excessive borrowing. They emphasize that the level of the
tax needs to be adjusted for the vulnerability of each sector in the economy.
In all of these papers, agents do not internalize the effect of fire sales on the value of other
agents’ assets, and, therefore, they overborrow ex ante. Our article differs from this literature
because it is not a model of crisis: There are neither aggregate shocks nor multiple steady-
state equilibria. The pecuniary externality is present in “normal” times, that is, in the unique
steady-state equilibrium.7 Furthermore, we propose a novel policy response to internalize the
pecuniary externality by showing that reducing the frequency of trading can be optimal. In
contrast, Jeanne and Korinek (2011) propose a Pigouvian tax on borrowing and Bianchi (2011)
proposes a tax on debt to internalize the pecuniary externality. Finally, the pecuniary externality
emerges from the portfolio choices and not from borrowing decisions.
2. THE MODEL
Time is discrete, and in each period there are three markets that open sequentially.8 In the
first market, agents trade money for nominal bonds. We refer to this market as the secondary
bond market. In the second market, agents produce or consume market-2 goods. We refer to
this market as the goods market. In the third market, agents consume and produce market-3
goods, receive money for maturing bonds, and acquire newly issued bonds. We refer to this
market as the primary bond market. All goods are nonstorable, which means that they cannot
be carried from one market to the next.
There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely lived agents. At the beginning of each period, agents
receive two idiosyncratic i.i.d. shocks: a preference shock and an entry shock. The preference
shock determines whether an agent can produce or consume market-2 goods. With probability
1 − n an agent can consume but not produce, and with probability n he can produce but not
consume. Consumers in the goods market are called buyers, and producers are called sellers.
The entry shock determines whether agents can participate in the secondary bondmarket.With
probability π they can, and with probability 1 − π they cannot. Agents who participate in the
secondary bond market are called active, whereas agents who do not are called passive. For
active agents, trading in the secondary bond market is frictionless.
In the goods market, agents meet at random in bilateral meetings. We represent trading
frictions by using a reduced-form matching function, ζM(n, 1 − n), where ζM specifies the
number of trade matches in a period and the parameter ζ is a scaling variable, which determines
the efficiency of thematching process (see, e.g., Rocheteau andWeill, 2011).We assume that the
matching function has constant returns to scale and is continuous and increasing with respect to
each of its arguments. Let δ(n) = ζM(n, 1 − n)(1 − n)−1 be the probability that a buyer meets a
seller. The probability that a seller meets a buyer is denoted by δs(n) = δ(n)(1 − n)n−1. In what
7 Rojas-Breu (2013) also identifies a pecuniary externality that is present in the steady-state equilibrium. In her
model, some agents use credit cards and some fiat money to acquire consumption goods. She shows that increasing
the fraction of agents that use credit cards can be welfare decreasing. The intuition for this result is that increasing the
fraction of agents that use credit cards can have a general equilibrium effect on the price level, which makes the agents
that have no credit card worse off. This effect can be so strong that overall welfare decreases. In contrast to our model,
in her model restricting the use of credit cards is a local optimum only, since it would be optimal to endow all agents
with credit cards.
8 Ourmodel builds on Lagos andWright (2005). This model is useful, because it allows us to introduce heterogeneous
preferences while still keeping the distribution of asset holdings analytically tractable.
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follows, to economize on notation, we suppress the argument n and refer to these probabilities
as δ and δs, respectively.
In the goods market, buyers get utility u(q) from consuming q units of market-2 goods,
where u′(q),−u′′(q) > 0, u′(0) = ∞, and u′(∞) = 0. Sellers incur the utility cost c(q) = q from
producing q units of market-2 goods.9
As in Lagos andWright (2005), we impose assumptions that yield a degenerate distribution of
portfolios at the beginning of the secondary bond market. That is, we assume that trading in the
primary bond market is frictionless, that all agents can produce and consume market-3 goods,
and that the production technology is linear such that h units of time produce h units ofmarket-3
goods. The utility of consuming x units of goods is U(x), where U ′(x),−U ′′(x) > 0,U ′(0) = ∞,
and U ′(∞) = 0.
Finally, agents discount between, but not within, periods. The discount factor between two
consecutive periods is β = 1/(1 + r), where r > 0 is the real interest rate.
2.1. First-Best Allocation. For a benchmark, it is useful to derive the planner allocation. The
planner treats all agents symmetrically. His optimization problem is
W = max
h,x,q
[δ(1 − n)u(q) − δsnq] + U(x) − h,(1)
subject to the feasibility constraint h ≥ x. The efficient allocation satisfiesU ′(x∗) = 1, u′(q∗) = 1,
and h∗ = x∗. These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who dictates consumption and
production.10
2.2. Pricing Mechanism. In what follows, we study the allocations that are attainable in a
market economy. To this end, we assume that the primary and secondary bond markets are
characterized by perfect competition. In contrast, wewill investigate several pricingmechanisms
for the goods market. The baseline case is random matching and generalized Nash bargaining.
However, we will also study random matching with Kalai bargaining and competitive pricing.
We are in particular interested in how the different pricing mechanisms affect the portfolio
choices of the agents in the primary and the secondary bond markets.
2.3. Money and Bonds. The description in this subsection closely follows Berentsen and
Waller (2011).11 There are two perfectly divisible and storable financial assets: money and one-
period, nominal discount bonds. Both are intrinsically useless, since they are neither arguments
of any utility function nor are they arguments of any production function. Both assets are issued
by the central bank in the last market. Bonds are payable to the bearer and default-free. One
bond pays off one unit of currency in the last market of the following period.
At the beginning of a period, after the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed, agents can trade
bonds and money in the perfectly competitive secondary bond market. The central bank acts as
the intermediary for all bond trades by recording purchases and sales of bonds. Bonds are book-
keeping entries—no physical object exists. This implies that agents are not anonymous to the
central bank. Nevertheless, despite having a record-keeping technology over bond trades, the
central bank has no record-keeping technology over goods trades. Since agents are anonymous
and cannot commit, a buyer’s promise in the goods market to deliver bonds to a seller in the
primary bond market is not credible.
9 We assume a linear utility cost for ease of exposition. It is a simple generalization to allow for a more general convex
disutility cost.
10 Since our planner can dictate quantities, there is no need for either money or bonds to achieve the first-best
allocation.
11 Our framework is similar to Berentsen and Waller (2011). However, the questions investigated are different. The
starting point in Berentsen and Waller (2011) is the observation that in monetary economies, when households face
binding liquidity constraints, they can either acquire additional liquidity by selling illiquid assets or by borrowing. They
show that these different methods for relaxing liquidity constraints lead to equivalent allocations under optimal policy.
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Since bonds are intangible objects, they cannot be used as a medium of exchange in the goods
market: hence they are illiquid. It has been shown in Kocherlakota (2003), Andolfatto (2011),
and Berentsen and Waller (2011) that in environments similar to the one studied here, it is
optimal that bonds are illiquid. All these papers assume unrestricted access to bond markets.
One of our contributions to this literature is to show that it is not only optimal that bonds
are illiquid but that it can be optimal to reduce their liquidity further by restricting access to
secondary bond markets.
Tomotivate a role for fiatmoney, searchmodels ofmoney typically impose three assumptions
on the exchange process (Shi, 2006, p. 650)12: a double coincidence problem, anonymity, and
costly communication. First, our preference structure creates a single-coincidence problem
in the goods market, since buyers do not have a good desired by sellers. Second, agents in
the goods market are anonymous, which rules out trade credit between individual buyers and
sellers. Third, there is nopublic communicationof individual tradingoutcomes (publicmemory),
which, in turn, eliminates the use of social punishments in support of gift-giving equilibria. The
combination of these frictions implies that sellers require immediate compensation frombuyers.
In short, there must be immediate settlement with some durable asset, and money is the only
such durable asset. These are the microfounded frictions that make money essential for trade
in the goods market.
DenoteMt as the per capita money stock and Bt as the per capita stock of newly issued bonds
at the end of period t. ThenMt−1 (Bt−1) is the beginning-of-periodmoney (bond) stock in period
t. Let ρt denote the price of bonds in the primary bond market. Then, the change in the money
stock in period t is given by
Mt − Mt−1 = τtMt−1 + Bt−1 − ρtBt.(2)
The change in the money supply at time t is given by three components: a lump-sum money
transfer (T = τtMt−1); the money created to redeem Bt−1 units of bonds; and the money with-
drawal from selling Bt units of bonds at the price ρt. We assume there are positive initial stocks
of money M0 and bonds B0, with B0M0 >
n
1−n . For τt < 0, the government must be able to extract
money via lump-sum taxes from the economy. Let B denote the bond-to-money ratio, B0/M0.
3. AGENT’S DECISIONS
For notational simplicity, the time subscript t is omitted when understood. Next-period vari-
ables are indexed by +1, and previous-period variables are indexed by −1. In what follows, we
look at a representative period t and work backwards from the primary bond market (the last
market) to the secondary bond market (the first market).
3.1. Primary Bond Market. In the primary bond market, agents can consume and produce
market-3 goods. Furthermore, they receive money for maturing bonds, buy newly issued bonds,
adjust their money balances by trading money for goods, and receive the lump-sum money
transfer T . An agent entering the primary bond market with m units of money and b units of
bonds has the indirect utility function V3(m,b). An agent’s decision problem in the primary
bond market is
V3(m,b) = max
x,h,m+1,b+1
[U(x) − h + βV1(m+1,b+1)],(3)
subject to
x + φm+1 + φρb+1 = h + φm + φb+ φT,(4)
12 See also Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), Araujo (2004), Aliprantis et al. (2007), Lagos and Wright (2008),
and Araujo et al. (2012) for discussions of what makes money essential.
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where φ is the price ofmoney in terms ofmarket-3 goods. The first-order conditions with respect
tom+1, b+1, and x are U ′(x) = 1 and
β∂V1
∂m+1
= ρ−1 β∂V1
∂b+1
= φ,(5)
where the term β∂V1/∂m+1 (β∂V1/∂b+1) is the marginal benefit of taking one additional unit
of money (bonds) into the next period, and φ (ρφ) is the marginal cost of doing so. Due to
the quasi-linearity of preferences, the choices of b+1 and m+1 are independent of b and m. It is
straightforward to show that all agents exit the primary bond market with the same portfolio of
bonds and money. The envelope conditions are
∂V3
∂m
= ∂V3
∂b
= φ.(6)
According to (6), the marginal value of money and bonds at the beginning of the primary bond
market is equal to the price of money in terms of market-3 goods. Note that Equations (6) imply
that the value function V3 is linear inm and b.
3.2. Goods Market. For the goods market, we make various assumptions of how the terms
of trade are determined. The baseline case is random matching and generalized Nash bargain-
ing. In the Appendix, we also derive the equilibrium under Kalai bargaining and competitive
pricing.
3.2.1. Generalized Nash bargaining. A matched buyer and seller bargain over the terms of
trade (q,d), where q is the quantity of goods and d is the amount of money exchanged in the
match. In what follows, we assume that the bargaining outcome satisfies the generalized Nash
bargaining solution.
The seller’s net payoff in a meeting in the goods market is given by −c(q) + V3(m +
d,b) − V3(m,b) and the buyer’s net payoff is given by u(q) + V3(m − d,b) − V3(m,b). Us-
ing the linearity of V3 with respect to m and b, the bargaining problem can be formulated as
follows:
(q,d) = argmax[u(q) − φd]θ[− c(q) + φd]1−θ
s.t. d ≤ m,(7)
where θ is the buyer’s bargaining weight, and m is the buyer’s money holding. The constraint
states that the buyer cannot spend more money than the amount he brought into the match.
If the buyer’s constraint is nonbinding, the solution is given by d < m and q = q∗, where q∗
satisfies u′(q∗) = 1. If the buyer’s constraint is binding, the solution is given by d = m and
θu′(q)[−c(q) + φd] = (1 − θ)c′(q) [u(q) − φd] .(8)
This latter condition can be written as follows:
φm = z(q) ≡ θc(q)u
′(q) + (1 − θ)u(q)c′(q)
θu′(q) + (1 − θ)c′(q) .(9)
This is by now a routine derivation of the Nash bargaining solution in a Lagos and Wright-type
model. More details can be found in Lagos and Wright (2005) or Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
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3.2.2. Value functions. The value function of a buyer entering the goods market withm units
of money and b units of bonds is
Vb2 (m,b) = δ [u(q) + V3 (m − d,b)] + (1 − δ)V3(m,b).(10)
With probability δ, the buyer has a match and the terms of trade are (q,d). Under these
terms, he receives consumption utility u(q) and expected continuation utility V3 (m − d,b).
With probability 1 − δ, he has no match and receives expected continuation utility V3(m,b). To
derive the marginal indirect utility of money and bonds, we take the total derivatives of (10)
with respect tom and b, respectively, and use (6) to replace ∂V3
∂m and
∂V3
∂b to get
∂Vb2
∂m
= δ
[
u′(q)
∂q
∂m
+ φ
(
1 − ∂d
∂m
)]
+ (1 − δ)φ and ∂V
b
2
∂b
= φ.(11)
If the buyer’s constraint (7) is nonbinding, then ∂q
∂m = 0 and ∂d∂m = 0. In this case, the buyer’s
envelope conditions (11) satisfy ∂V
b
2
∂m = ∂V3∂m = φ. If the constraint is binding, then ∂q∂m = φz′(q) and
∂d
∂m = 1. In this case, the buyer’s envelope conditions (11) can be rewritten as follows:
∂Vb2
∂m
= δφu
′(q)
z′(q)
+ (1 − δ)φ and ∂V
b
2
∂b
= φ.(12)
Thefirst equality simply states that abuyer’smarginal utility ofmoneyhas two components:With
probability δ he has a match, and by spending the marginal unit he receives utility φu′(q)z′(q)−1,
andwith probability 1 − δ he has nomatch, inwhich case by spending themarginal unit ofmoney
in the last market he receives utility φ. The second equality states that a buyer’s marginal utility
of bonds at the beginning of the goods market is equal to the price of money in the last market,
since bonds are illiquid in the goods market.
The value function of a seller entering the goods market with m units of money and b units
of bonds is
Vs2(m,b) = δs [−c(q) + V3 (m + d,b)] + (1 − δs)V3(m,b).(13)
The interpretation of (13) is similar to the interpretation of (10) and is omitted. Taking the total
derivative of (13) with respect to m and b, respectively, and using (6) to replace ∂V3
∂m and
∂V3
∂b
yields the seller’s envelope conditions:
∂Vs2
∂m
= ∂V
s
2
∂b
= φ.(14)
These conditions simply state that a seller’smarginal utility ofmoney and bonds at the beginning
of the goods market are equal to the price of money in the last market. The reason is that a
seller has no use for these two assets in the goods market.
3.3. Secondary BondMarket. Let (mˆ, bˆ) denote the portfolio of an active agent after trading
in the secondary bond market, and let ϕ denote the price of bonds in terms of money in the
secondary bond market. Then, an active agent’s budget constraint satisfies
φm + ϕφb ≥ φmˆ + ϕφbˆ.(15)
The left-hand side of (15) is the sum of the real values of money and bonds with which the agent
enters the secondary bond market, and the right-hand side is the real value of the portfolio with
which the agent leaves the secondary bond market.
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Trading is further constrained by two short-selling constraints: Active agents cannot sell more
bonds, and they cannot spendmoremoney than the amount they carry from the previous period;
that is,
mˆ ≥ 0, bˆ ≥ 0.(16)
Let V j1 (m,b) denote the value functions of an active buyer (j = b) or an active seller (j = s).
Then, an active agent’s decision problem is
V j1 (m,b) = max
mˆ,bˆ
V j2 (mˆ, bˆ) s.t. (15) and (16).
The secondary bond market’s first-order conditions for active agents are
∂V j2
∂mˆ
= φλj − λjm, and
∂V j2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλj − λjb,(17)
where, for j = b, s, λj are the Lagrange multipliers on (15) and λjm and λjb are the Lagrange
multipliers on (16).
Finally, let V1(m,b) denote the expected value for an agent who enters the secondary bond
market withm units of money and b units of bonds before the idiosyncratic shocks are realized.
Then, V1(m,b) satisfies
V1(m,b) = π(1 − n)Vb1 (m,b) + πnVs1(m,b) + (1 − π)(1 − n)Vb2 (m,b) + (1 − π)nVs2(m,b).
Note that passive buyers and passive sellers cannot change their portfolios and so their value
functions at thebeginningof the secondarybondmarket areVb2 (m,b) andV
s
2(m,b), respectively.
The envelope conditions in the secondary bond market are
∂V1
∂m
= πφ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π)
[
(1 − n)∂V
b
2
∂m
+ n ∂V
s
2
∂m
]
,(18)
∂V1
∂b
= πφϕ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π)
[
(1 − n)∂V
b
2
∂b
+ n ∂V
s
2
∂b
]
.(19)
According to (18), the marginal value of money at the beginning of the period consists of four
components: With probability (1 − n)π, an agent is an active buyer, in which case he receives
the shadow value of money λb; with probability nπ, he is an active seller, in which case he
receives the shadow value of money λs; with probability (1 − n) (1 − π), he is a passive buyer,
in which case he receives the marginal value of money at the beginning of the goods market;
with probability n (1 − π), he is a passive seller, in which case he receives the marginal value of
money at the beginning of the goods market.
4. MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM
We focus on symmetric, stationary monetary equilibria, where all agents follow identical
strategies and where real variables are constant over time. Let η ≡ B/B−1 denote the gross
growth rate of bonds, and let γ ≡ M/M−1 denote the gross growth rate of the money supply.
These definitions allow us to write (2) as follows:
γ − 1 − τ = B−1
M−1
(1 − ρη) .(20)
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In a stationary monetary equilibrium, the real stock of money must be constant; that is, φM =
φ+1M+1, implying that γ = φ/φ+1. Furthermore, the real amount of bonds must be constant;
that is, φB = φ−1B−1. This implies η = γ, which we can use to rewrite (20) as
γ − 1 − τ = B0
M0
(1 − ργ) .(21)
The model has three types of stationary monetary equilibria. In what follows, we characterize
these types of equilibria. To simplify notation, let
(q) ≡ δu
′(q)
z′(q)
+ 1 − δ.(22)
Furthermore, inwhat followsweassume that(q) is decreasing inq. This assumption guarantees
that our stationary monetary equilibrium derived below is unique.13
4.1. Type I Equilibrium. In a type I equilibrium, an active buyer’s bond constraint in the
secondary bond market does not bind, and a seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond
market does not bind. In the Appendix, we show that a type I equilibrium can be characterized
by the four equations stated in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1. A type I equilibrium is a time-independent list {q, qˆ, ρ, ϕ} satisfying
ϕ = 1,(23)
γ
β
= π + (1 − π)[(1 − n)(q) + n],(24)
ρ = β
γ
,(25)
u′(qˆ) = z′(qˆ).(26)
In a type I equilibrium, the seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond market does
not bind. This can only be the case if he is indifferent between holding money or bonds,
which requires ϕ = 1; that is, that Equation (23) holds. According to (25), the price of bonds
in the primary bond market is equal to its fundamental value β/γ. The reason for this re-
sult is that bonds in the primary market attain no liquidity premium (see our Discussion
later), since an active buyer’s constraint on bond holdings in the secondary bond market does
not bind.
According to (26), active buyers consume the quantity qˆ that satisfies u′(qˆ) = z′(qˆ). If θ < 1,
then qˆ < q∗, so they consume the inefficient quantity even as β → γ. If θ = 1, then qˆ = q∗, and
they consume the efficient quantity. From (24), the consumed quantity for passive buyers, q, is
inefficient for all θ.
4.2. Type II Equilibrium. In a type II equilibrium, an active buyer’s bond constraint in the
secondary bond market does not bind, and a seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond
market binds. In the Appendix, we show that a type II equilibrium can be characterized by the
four equations stated in Lemma 2.
13 Lagos and Wright (2005, p. 472) investigate under which conditions u
′(q)
z′(q) is decreasing in q. They argue that
u′(q)
z′(q)
“is monotone if θ ≈ 1, or if c(q) is linear and u′(q) log-concave.” For a comprehensive study of existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium in the Lagos and Wright framework, see Wright (2010).
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LEMMA 2. A type II equilibrium is a time-independent list {q, qˆ, ρ, ϕ} satisfying
1
ϕ
= (qˆ),(27)
γ
β
= π
ϕ
+ (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n] ,(28)
ρ = β
γ
,(29)
z(q) = z(qˆ)(1 − n).(30)
The interpretations of the equilibrium equations in Lemma 2 are similar to their respective
equations in Lemma 1. The key difference is that the price of bonds in the secondary bond
market satisfies ϕ < 1. The reason is that now an active seller’s constraint on money holdings is
binding. Consequently, money is scarce and so buyers are willing to sell a fraction of their bonds
at a discount; that is, ϕ < 1. Note that a buyer’s constraint on bond holdings is still nonbinding,
since he is only selling a fraction of his bonds. Accordingly, the price of bonds in the primary
bondmarket, ρ, continues to be equal to its fundamental value, β/γ, as in the type I equilibrium.
Finally, (30) reflects the fact that the cash constraints of the active and passive buyers in the
goods market are binding. Consequently, consumption of market-2 goods is inefficiently low
for both active and passive buyers.
4.3. Type III Equilibrium. In a type III equilibrium, both the active buyer’s bond constraint
and the active seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond market bind. In the Appendix, we
show that a type III equilibrium can be characterized by the four equations stated in Lemma 3.
LEMMA 3. A type III equilibrium is a time-independent list {q, qˆ, ρ, ϕ} satisfying
1
ϕ
= B0
M0
1 − n
n
,(31)
γ
β
= π[(1 − n)(qˆ) + n/ϕ] + (1 − π)[(1 − n)(q) + n],(32)
ρ = β
γ
{
1 + π(1 − n)[ϕ(qˆ) − 1]} ,(33)
z(q) = z(qˆ)(1 − n).(34)
According to (33), the price of bonds in the primary bondmarket ρ includes two components:
the fundamental value of bonds, β/γ, and the liquidity premium, β
γ
π(1 − n) [ϕ(qˆ) − 1]. The
liquidity premium is increasing in π and equal to zero at π = 0. In contrast, there is no liquidity
premium in the type I and type II equilibria, since an active buyer’s constraint on bond holdings
is not binding.
Furthermore, from (31), note that the price of bonds in the secondary bond market, ϕ, is
constant (in contrast to the type II equilibrium). The reason is that in Lemma 3, ϕ is obtained
from the secondary bond market budget constraint, (15). In contrast, in Lemmas 1 and 2 it is
obtained from the secondary bond market first-order conditions (17). Finally, (34) has the same
interpretation as (30).
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TABLE 1
BOND PRICES, EQUILIBRIUM REGIONS, AND MULTIPLIERS
Value of ϕ Value of ρ Inflation Range Multipliers
ϕ = [(qˆ)]−1 = 1 ρ = β/γ β ≤ γ < γL λsm = λbb = 0
ϕ = [(qˆ)]−1 < 1 ρ = β/γ γL ≤ γ < γH λsm > λbb = 0
ϕ = M0B0
n
1−n ρ = βγ
{
1 + π(1 − n) [ϕ(qˆ) − 1]} γH ≤ γ λsm, λbb > 0
4.4. Regions of Equilibria. In the following proposition, we characterize three nonover-
lapping regions in which these three types of equilibria exist. To this end, let γL denote the
value of γ such that expressions (24) and (28) hold simultaneously. Furthermore, let γH de-
note the value of γ such that Equations (28) and (32) hold simultaneously. In the proof of
Proposition 1, we show that such values exist and that they are unique. Furthermore, we show
that β ≤ γL ≤ γH < ∞.
PROPOSITION 1. If β ≤ γ < γL, equilibrium prices and quantities are characterized by Lemma
1; if γL ≤ γ < γH, they are characterized by Lemma 2; and if γH ≤ γ, they are characterized by
Lemma 3.
Table 1 summarizes the bondpricesϕ and ρ and the relevantmultipliers in the three equilibria.
In the types I and II equilibria (β ≤ γ < γH), the constraint on bond holdings of active buyers
does not bind (λbb = 0) in the secondary bond market. This implies that the return on bonds in
the secondary bond market, 1/ϕ, has to be equal to the expected return on money, (qˆ). It also
implies that the price of bonds in the primary bond market, ρ, must equal the fundamental value
of bonds, β/γ. The economics underlying this result are straightforward. Since active buyers do
not sell all their bonds for money in the secondary bond market, bonds in the primary bond
market have no liquidity premium, and so the Fisher equation holds; that is, 1/ρ = γ/β.
In contrast, in the type III equilibrium, the constraint on bond holdings of active buyers binds
in the secondary bond market. Consequently, bonds attain a liquidity premium, and the Fisher
equation does not hold; that is, 1/ρ < γ/β.14
Figure 1 graphically characterizes the bond prices, ϕ and ρ, as a function of γ in the three types
of equilibria. An interesting aspect of the model is that when π = 1, the two bond prices are
equal for any value of γ.15 Furthermore, the type I equilibrium only exists at γ = β. In contrast,
there is a strictly positive spread ϕ − ρ, when π < 1 and γ > β.
Why is there a positive spread ϕ − ρ if π < 1? If π < 1, the price ρ reflects the fact that bonds
can only be traded with probability π in the secondary bond market. In contrast, the price ϕ
reflects the fact that active agents can trade bonds with probability 1 in the secondary bond
market. Thus, the positive spread is because the bonds in the secondary bond market have a
higher liquidity premium than the bonds in the primary bond market.
As can be seen in Figure 1, when π < 1, the price of bonds in the secondary bond market, ϕ,
is constant and equal to 1 in the type I equilibrium, it is decreasing in the type II equilibrium,
and it is constant in the type III equilibrium. The price of bonds in the primary bond market,
ρ, follows a different pattern. In the type I and type II equilibria, it is equal to the fundamental
value of bonds, β/γ, whereas in the type III equilibrium, it contains a liquidity premium. The
lower π in the type III equilibrium is, the larger is the difference between ϕ and ρ.
14 In a similar environment, Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2012) also analyze under what conditions a liquidity
premium exists in the primary financial market.
15 To see this, consider, first, Equations (32) and (33). Setting π = 1 and rearranging yields ρ = ϕ = M0B0
n
1−n . Consider,
next, Equations (28) and (29). Again, setting π = 1 and rearranging yields ρ = ϕ = β
γ
. Finally, at π = 1, the type I
equilibrium only exists under the Friedman rule γ = β.
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FIGURE 1
BOND PRICES WHEN π = 1 AND π < 1
5. OPTIMAL PARTICIPATION
In this section, we explain why restricting participation to the secondary bond market can
be welfare-improving. The reason is straightforward. The secondary bond market provides
insurance against the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. At the end of a period in the primary bond
market, agents choose a portfolio of bonds and money. At this point, they do not know yet
whether they will be buyers or sellers in the following period. At the beginning of the following
period, this information is revealed, and they can use the secondary bond market to readjust
their portfolio of money and illiquid bonds.
From a welfare point of view, the benefit of the secondary bond market is that it allocates
liquidity to the buyers and allows sellers to earn interest on their idle money holdings. The
drawback of this opportunity is that the secondary bond market reduces the incentive to self-
insure against the liquidity shocks. This lowers the demand for money in the primary bond
market, which depresses its value. This effect can be so strong that it can be optimal to restrict
access to the secondary bond market. The basic mechanism can be seen from the following
welfare calculations.
The welfare function can be written as follows:
(1 − β)W = (1 − n)δ {π [u(qˆ) − qˆ] + (1 − π) [u(q) − q]}+ U(x∗) − x∗,(35)
where the term in the curly brackets is an agent’s expected period utility in the goods market,
and U(x∗) − x∗ is the agent’s period utility in the primary bond market.
Differentiating (35) with respect to π yields
1 − β
(1 − n)δ
dW
dπ
= [u(qˆ) − qˆ] − [u(q) − q](36)
+π [u′(qˆ) − 1] dqˆ
dπ
+ (1 − π) [u′(q) − 1] dq
dπ
.
The contribution of the first two terms to the change in welfare is always positive, since in any
equilibrium qˆ ≥ q (with strict inequality for γ > β). However, the derivatives dqˆdπ and dqdπ can
be negative, reflecting the fact that increasing participation reduces the incentive to self-insure
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TABLE 2
CALIBRATION TARGETS
Parameter Target Description Target Value
β Average real interest rate r 0.991
γ Average change in the consumer price index 1.01
B Average bonds-to-money ratio 3.52
ζ Set equal to 1 1.00
π Average price of gov. bonds with a maturity of three months 0.987
A Average velocity of money (annual) 6.72
n Average price of gov. bonds with a remaining maturity of seven days 0.999
θ Retail sector markup 0.300
against idiosyncratic liquidity risk.16 Reducing the incentive to self-insure reduces the demand
for money and hence its value, which then reduces the consumption quantities q and qˆ.
Whether restricting participation is welfare-improving depends on which of the two effects
dominates. One can show that in the type I and in the type II equilibria it is always optimal
to set π = 1. In contrast, restricting participation in the type III equilibrium can be welfare-
improving. Whether it is depends on preferences and technology. In the following, we calibrate
the model to investigate whether restricting access to the secondary bond market is optimal
under reasonable parameter values.17
6. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We choose a model period as one quarter. The functions u(q), c(q), andU (x) have the forms
u(q) = Aq1−α/(1 − α), c(q) = q, and U (x) = log(x).
For the matching function, we follow Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and choose
M(B,S) = BS/(B+ S),
whereB = 1 − n is the measure of buyers and S = n the measure of sellers in the goods market.
Therefore, the matching probability of a buyer in the goods market is simply given by δ =
ζM(B,S)/B = ζn.
The parameters to be identified are as follows: (i) preference parameters: (β,A, α); (ii)
technology parameters: (n, π); (iii) bargaining power: θ; (iv) policy parameters: the money
growth rate γ and the bonds-to-money ratio B. Finally, we set ζ = 1 for all but one calibration,
where as a robustness check we choose ζ = 0.5.
To identify these parameters, we use U.S. data from the first quarter of 1960 to the fourth
quarter of 2010. All data sources are provided in the Appendix. Table 2 lists the identification
restrictions and the identified values of the parameters.
The gross growth rate of the money supply γ = 1.01 matches the average quarterly change in
the consumer price index. We set β = 0.991 so that the real interest rate in the model matches
the data, measured as the difference between the rate on AAA corporate bonds and the change
in the consumer price index. The bonds-to-money ratio B = 3.52 matches the average empirical
16 Sufficient conditions for these derivatives to be strictly negative are that inflation is sufficiently large so that the
economy is in the type III equilibrium (with q < qˆ < q∗) and that (q) = δ u′(q)z′(q) + 1 − δ is decreasing in q, which is an
assumption throughout the article.
17 In Berentsen et al. (2011a), we provided an analytical proof that if inflation is sufficiently high, it is optimal to
restrict access to the secondary bond market for u(q) = ln(q) and perfect competition in the goods market.
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TABLE 3
NASH BARGAINING
Description Baseline Markup High B High ϕ Lowδ
A Utility weight 1.42 1.47 1.48 1.41 1.51
n Number of sellers 0.778 0.778 0.818 0.779 0.778
θ Buyer’s bargaining share 0.387 0.309 0.416 0.390 0.495
π Calibrated π 0.588 0.550 0.594 0.574 0.514
π∗ Optimal πa 0.589 0.548 0.568 0.555 0.532
sGM Goods market size 0.315 0.301 0.310 0.310 0.144
NOTES: The table displays the calibrated values for the key parameters A, n, and θ for the value of α = 0.15. It also
displays the calibrated value of π, the optimal value of π (π∗), and the size of the goods market (sGM). aπ∗ is calculated
numerically by searching for the welfare-maximizing value of π, holding all other parameters at their calibrated values.
bonds-to-money ratio, which we calculate as the ratio of the total public debt to the M1 money
stock.18
The parameters θ, π, n, andA are obtained by matching the following targets simultaneously:
First, we set θ such that the markup in the goods market matches the retail data summa-
rized by Faig and Jerez (2005). They provide a target markup of μ = 0.3 (30%).19 Second,
we set π to match the average price of government bonds with a maturity of three months,
which is ρ = 0.987. Note, from Proposition 1, that ρ = 0.987 > β/γ = 0.982 implies that we
are in the type III equilibrium. Third, we interpret the price ϕ as the price of a government
bond with a remaining maturity of seven days; that is, ϕ = ρ4/52 = 0.999, and we use it to cal-
ibrate n.20 Fourth, we set A to match the average velocity of money. The model’s velocity of
money is21
v = Y
φM−1
= 1 + (1 − n)δ [πz(qˆ) + (1 − π) z(q)]
z(q)
,
which depends on i via q and qˆ, and on A and α via the function z(q). Although there are
alternative ways to fit this relationship, we setA to match the average Y/φM−1, usingM1 as our
measure of money.
Our targets discussed above and summarized in Table 2 are sufficient to calibrate all but one
parameter, the elasticity of the utility function α. Berentsen et al. (2011b) estimate that α ∈
(0.105, 0.211), depending on the calibration method. We, therefore, first present the calibration
results for an average value of α = 0.15 and, then, show the effects of different values of α later
on.22
6.1. Baseline Results and Robustness Checks under Nash Bargaining. Table 3 presents the
results for the baseline calibration and four robustness checks under generalized Nash bar-
gaining. The robustness checks are defined as follows: In the calibration labeled “markup,” we
18 This definition is in line with Martin (2012).
19 SeeAruoba et al. (2011) or Berentsen et al. (2011b) on calibrating LW-typemodels, includingmatching themarkup
data.
20 We show in the robustness analysis that our results are not very sensitive to the choice of ϕ.
21 The real output in the goods market is YGM = (1 − n)δ[πφmˆ + (1 − π)φm], where φmˆ = z(qˆ) and φM−1 = φm =
z(q), and the real output in the primary bond market is YPBM = 1. Accordingly, total real output of the economy adds
up to Y = YGM + YPBM, and the model-implied velocity of money is v = Y/φM−1.
22 Most monetary models that calibrate variants of the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework set α to match the
elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. We cannot do this because in our framework
the interest rate on ρ represents the yield on three-month government bonds, whereas related studies work with the
AAA Moody’s corporate bond yield to calculate the elasticity of money demand. Using U.S. data from 1960 to 2010,
we obtain an empirical elasticity of money demand with respect to the yield on three-month government bonds of
ξgov = 0.05. The elasticity of money demand in our model is negative by construction, which precludes the use of this
target.
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FIGURE 2
φm FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF π
target a markup in the goods market of 40% instead of 30%; in the calibration labeled “high B,”
we target B = 4.5 instead of B = 3.5; in the calibration labeled “high ϕ,” we target a remaining
maturity of government bonds of one day instead of seven days; and in the calibration labeled
“low δ,” we set ζ = 0.5 instead of ζ = 1.
Table 3 presents the key parameter values for the baseline calibration and the ro-
bustness checks when α = 0.15. To address the question of whether there is too much
trading in the secondary bond market, we also calculate the optimal entry probability
π∗ for each case. It is calculated as follows. For each set of calibrated parameter val-
ues, we numerically search for the value of π that maximizes ex ante welfare, defined
by (35).
We find two key results. First, our calibrations always yield an entry probability π, which is
strictly below1. Second, the optimal entry probabilityπ∗ is below the calibrated entry probability
for a sufficiently high markup, a high bonds-to-money ratio, and a high value of ϕ. In contrast,
under the baseline calibration and the calibration with a low matching probability δ, we find
that π∗ is above π. In Table 3, we also provide the estimates of the model-implied goods market
share, sGM = YGM/Y . UnderNash bargaining, it is approximately 31% for ζ = 1, and for a lower
matching probability (ζ = 0.5) it is about 14%, which is in line with the estimates of Berentsen
et al. (2011b) and related studies.
To provide more intuition about why π∗ is smaller than the calibrated value of π for most
robustness checks, we show, in Figure 2, the effect of changing π on the value of money φm.
For all cases, the value of money in Figure 2 is strictly decreasing in π. This confirms
our intuition that having access to the secondary bond market, reduces the demand for
money, m, and since the supply of money is given and equal to M, it reduces the real stock
of money φm. For a high bonds-to-money ratio, the value of money decreases at a faster
rate. This is intuitive, as a high value of B allows active agents to trade more bonds in the
secondary bond market and, thus, reduces the incentive to self-insure against the liquidity
shocks.
How sensitive are our results to the gross inflation rate γ? To answer this question, we show
the effect of increasing γ on the difference between π∗ and π in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that for all the calibration experiments an increase in γ lowers the difference
π∗ − π. The explanation for this result is straightforward. A higher inflation rate increases the
opportunity cost of holding money and, thus, reduces the incentive to self-insure against the
liquidity shocks. This reduces the value of money and so welfare. To correct this pecuniary
externality effect, a substantially lower value of π∗ is needed to induce agents to increase their
money holdings.
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FIGURE 3
π∗ − π FOR INCREASING VALUES OF γ
FIGURE 4
π∗ − π FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF α
6.2. The Effect of the Elasticity of the Utility Function. How sensitive are our results to the
choice of α? In order to answer this question, we recalibrate each model presented in Table 3
for different values of α ∈ (0, 1) and draw the difference π∗ − π in Figure 4.
For the baseline calibration under Nash bargaining, we find that π < π∗ for any α ∈ (0, 1). In
contrast, for calibrations “markup,” “high B,” “high ϕ,” and “low δ” there is a strictly positive
range for which there is too much entry; that is, π > π∗. A higher markup in the goods market
appears to have the largest effect, since π∗ − π < 0 for any value of α > 0.14.
Note also that increasing the bonds-to-money ratio from 3.5 to 4.5 results in π∗ − π < 0 for
0.1 < α < 0.28 and 0.82 < α < 1. This is insofar interesting, since in the U.S. data the bonds-to-
money ratio is steadily increasing over time in our sample, and since 1996 it is above the value
of 4.5. Furthermore, in 2010 it reached 7.7.
6.3. Other Pricing Mechanisms. Hereafter, we compare the calibration results for different
trading protocols to our baseline calibration under Nash bargaining. The calibration labeled
“Kalai” refers to Kalai bargaining, where we use zK(q) instead of z(q). The calibration labeled
“CP” refers to competitive pricing. By setting θ = 1, themodel equations reduce to the ones that
one obtains from assuming competitive pricing in the goods market. See the Appendix, where
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TABLE 4
OTHER PRICING MECHANISMS
Description Baseline Kalai CP
A goods market utility weight 1.42 1.38 1.30
n number of sellers 0.778 0.778 0.778
θ buyer’s bargaining power 0.387 0.433 1
π calibrated π 0.588 0.564 0.772
π∗ optimal πa 0.589 0.659 0.949
sGM goods market size 0.315 0.306 0.382
NOTES: The table displays the calibrated values for the key parameters A, n, and θ for the value of α = 0.15. It also
displays the calibrated value of π, the optimal value of π (π∗), and the size of the goods market (sGM). aπ∗ is calculated
numerically by searching for the welfare maximizing value of π, holding all other parameters at their calibrated values.
we also derive the Kalai bargaining solution. Table 4 presents the parameter values obtained
for the different pricing mechanisms for α = 0.15.23
In contrast to Nash bargaining, for competitive pricing the difference of π∗ − π is clearly
positive. This indicates that the access to the secondary bond market is too low. Note though,
that the result that π∗ < 1 continues to hold. That is, it is not optimal to grant unrestricted access
to the secondary bond market. Our reading of these results is that our calibration measures the
frictions in these markets and that under certain calibrations the existing frictions π are too high
(π < π∗) and in others they are too low (π > π∗). However, we always find that eliminating all
frictions by setting π = 1 is suboptimal.
7. DISCUSSION
In the discussion, we first relate our framework to Kocherlakota (2003) and Shi (2008). We
then show that if agents have a choice to participate in the secondary bond market, they strictly
prefer to do so.
7.1. Relation to Kocherlakota (2003) and Shi (2008). In the Shi (2008) framework, there is
no secondary bondmarket. Rather, he assumes that agents are allowed to use bonds andmoney
to pay for goods in some trade meetings, while they can only use money to pay for goods in
some other trade meetings.24 He shows that such a legal restriction can be welfare-improving.
In his model, there are two types of goods: red and green. The costs of production are the same
for the two colors, but the marginal utilities differ. Formally, consumption utility is represented
by the utility function θj u
(
cj
)
, where cj is consumption of good j, and j denotes the good type:
G (green) and R (red). It is assumed that θG = 1 and θR = θ > 0.
Once agents arematched, they receive amatching shock:With a 50%probability the red good
is produced, andwith a 50%probability the green good is produced. In eachmatch, buyersmake
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The legal restriction imposed by Shi (2008) is that while money can
be used in both matches, bonds as a means of payment cannot be used in red trades. This legal
restriction is welfare-improving if the relative marginal utility of red goods is less than one, but
not too small. The intuition is that in the economy without this legal restriction agents consume
the same amount of goods in all matches, because money and bonds are perfect substitutes
(see Table 5, where qR1 = qG1 ). This allocation is inefficient, because efficiency requires that
consumption of green goods is higher than consumption of red goods (see Table 5, where the
efficient quantities satisfy qR∗ < q
G
∗ ). The legal restriction, thus, shifts consumption from the red
23 Notice that the markup target is only used for the baseline calibration and Kalai bargaining.
24 Since in the Shi framework agents can use money and bonds to pay for goods in some matches, it is more closely
related to the literature that studies competing media of exchange (see, e.g., Geromichalos et al., 2007; Lagos and
Rocheteau, 2007, 2008, 2009; Lester et al., 2012).
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TABLE 5
CONSUMED QUANTITY IN SHI, KOCHERLAKOTA, AND OUR MODEL
Casea Description Shi (IS)b Kocherlakota Our Modelc
1 Liquid bonds qG1 = qR1 < qR∗ < qG∗ q1< q∗ q1< q∗
2 Illiquid bonds, SBM, π = 1 − q1< q2< q∗ q1< q2< q∗
3 Partially liquid bonds (Shi) qR3 < q
R
1 = qG1 < qG3 − −
4 Illiquid bonds, SBM, π < 1 − − qNA4 < qA4 < q∗
NOTES: Variables labeled with an * indicate efficient quantities. In Shi, the efficient quantities differ in green matches,
qG∗ , and red matches, qR∗ , whereas in our model there is only one efficient quantity, q∗.
aThe lower-case index of the variables refers to the equilibrium quantities in the following cases: (1) an economy with
liquid bonds; (2) an economy with illiquid bonds and with unrestricted access to the secondary bond market (SBM); (3)
an economy with partially liquid bonds without an SBM; (4) an economy with illiquid bonds and with restricted access
to the secondary bond market.
bIS refers to the “Imperfect Substitutability” equilibrium in Shi.
cqA4 and q
NA
4 are the consumption quantities for agents that have access and no access to the SBM in our model.
good to the more highly valued green good. This smoothes marginal utilities across green and
red matches, which is welfare increasing.
In Shi, thewelfare improvement arises because the legal restriction shifts consumption toward
themore desired green good. In Kocherlakota and in our model, this mechanism is absent, since
there is only one good and, hence, only one efficient quantity (see Table 5, where the efficient
quantity is denoted q∗). The welfare benefits of creating illiquid bonds and letting agents trade
them in a secondary bond market arises because it increases consumption as explained later.
When bonds are as liquid as money, all agents consume the same quantity q1 < q∗ in
Kocherlakota and in our model, and qG1 = qR1 in Shi (see Table 5, case 1).25 When bonds are
illiquid and when there is a secondary bonds market, where all agents can trade (π = 1), all
agents consume the same quantity as indicated by the quantity q2 < q∗ in case 2 of Table 5. Note,
though, that q1 < q2 implies that creating illiquid bonds and allowing agents to trade them for
money in response to liquidity shocks in a secondary bond market improves the allocation. We
next consider our key result, which is that it can be welfare-improving to set π < 1. There are
two effects of such a policy. First, it introduces variance in the marginal utilities across matches,
since agents who have access to the secondary bonds market trade different quantities than
agents who have no access. In Table 5, case 4, the former trade the quantity qA4 , and the latter
trade the quantity qNA4 , with q
NA
4 < q
A
4 . Introducing consumption variability is clearly costly.
Nevertheless, we show that it can be welfare-improving because such a policy can increase
the value of money and, hence, consumption quantities. Since our mechanism adds a wedge
between marginal utilities across matches, whereas Shi’s mechanism reduces such a wedge, it
should be clear that our mechanism is very different from Shi’s legal restriction model.
7.2. Endogenous Participation. So far, we have assumed that participation in the secondary
bond market is determined by the exogenous idiosyncratic participation shock π. Suppose
instead that each agent has a choice. Recall that Vb1 (m,b) is the expected lifetime utility of a
buyer at the beginning of the secondary bond market, and Vb2 (m,b) is the expected lifetime
utility of a buyer at the beginning of the goods market who had no access to the secondary bond
market. Then, for a buyer, it is optimal to participate if
Vb1 (m,b) ≥ Vb2 (m,b).
Note that the exact experiment here is to keep all prices at their equilibrium values for a given
participation rate π and, then, to ask the question whether a single buyer would prefer to enter
25 In fact, q1 is the same quantity that would be consumed in a model without bonds (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005)
or in a model with liquid bonds, since liquid bonds do not affect the allocation.
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the secondary bond market. The move of a single buyer from passive to active does not change
equilibrium prices.
LEMMA 4. In any equilibrium, Vb1 (m,b) − Vb2 (m,b) ≥ 0.
According to Lemma 4, a buyer is always better off when participating in the secondary bond
market. To develop an intuition for this result, note that, as shown in the proof of Lemma 4,
Vb1 (m,b) − Vb2 (m,b) = u(qˆ) − qˆ − [u(q) − q] − i (qˆ − q) ,(37)
where i = (1 − ϕ) /ϕ is the nominal interest rate. A passive buyer’s period surplus is u(q) − q,
whereas an active buyer’s surplus is u(qˆ) − qˆ − i (qˆ − q), where the term i (qˆ − q) measures
the utility cost of selling bonds to finance the difference qˆ − q ≥ 0. The difference u(qˆ) − qˆ −
[u(q) − q] is strictly positive, whereas the term −i (qˆ − q) is negative. The reason is that in any
equilibrium, q ≤ qˆ ≤ q∗. Thus, the equilibrium interest rate cannot be too large in order for
(37) to be positive. In the proof of Lemma 4, we replace i in (37) for all three types of equilibria
and find that Vb1 (m,b) − Vb2 (m,b) > 0.
We now turn to the sellers. For them, we also find that they are better off when participating
in the secondary bond market.
LEMMA 5. In any equilibrium, V s1(m,b) − Vs2(m,b) ≥ 0.
In the type I equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is i = 0. In this case, Vs1(m,b) = Vs2(m,b).
In the type II and type III equilibria, the nominal interest rate is i > 0. In this case, the seller
strictly prefers to enter, since Vs1(m,b) > V
s
2(m,b).
8. CONCLUSION
We construct a general equilibrium model with a liquid asset and an illiquid asset. Agents
experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks after which they can trade these assets in a secondary
bond market. We find that an agent’s portfolio choice of liquid and illiquid assets involves a
pecuniary externality. An agent does not take into account that by holding more of the liquid
asset he not only acquires additional insurance against his own idiosyncratic liquidity risks,
but he also marginally increases the value of the liquid asset, which improves insurance for
other market participants. This pecuniary externality can be corrected by restricting, but not
eliminating, access to the secondary bond market.
Our results provide justifications for policies that make trading in financial markets difficult.
This should come as no shock to anyone who knows the theory of the second best. Our model
is an incomplete market model. It is well known that in such environments, adding frictions
and/or taxes can improve the allocation.
APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. We first note that in any equilibrium (i.e., types I, II, and III), a buyer
will never use all his money to buy bonds in the secondary bond market, implying that λbm = 0.
Furthermore, a seller will never spend all his bonds for money in the secondary bond market,
implying that λsb = 0.
Furthermore, in a type I equilibrium, an active buyer’s bond constraint in the secondary bond
market does not bind (λbb = 0), and a seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond market does
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not bind (λsm = 0). Using these values for the multipliers, we can rewrite the secondary bond
market first-order conditions (17) as follows:
∂Vb2
∂mˆ
= φλb and ∂V
b
2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλb,(A.1)
∂Vs2
∂mˆ
= φλs and ∂V
s
2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλs.(A.2)
Furthermore, combining the previous expressions with (12) and (14), we have
λb = δu
′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
+ 1 − δ and ϕλb = 1,(A.3)
λs = 1 and ϕλs = 1.(A.4)
Then, (A.4) implies that ϕ = 1; that is, that (23) holds.
Then, from (A.3), the fact that ϕ = 1 immediately implies that λb = 1, which then implies that
u′(qˆ) = z′(qˆ); that is, that (26) holds.
Use (12) and (14) to write (18) and (19) as follows:
∂V1
∂m
= πφ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π)[(1 − n)φ(q) + nφ],(A.5)
∂V1
∂b
= πφ[(1 − n)ϕλb + nϕλs] + (1 − π)[(1 − n)φ + nφ].(A.6)
Use the primary bond market first-order conditions (5) to write the previous equations as
follows:
γ
β
= π[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n],(A.7)
ργ
β
= πϕ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + 1 − π.(A.8)
We have already established that in the type I equilibrium λb = λs = ϕ = 1. This implies, from
(A.8), that ρ = β/γ; that is, that Equation (25) holds. Finally, (24) immediately follows from
(A.7).
Note that if θ < 1, active buyers consume the inefficient quantity, since qˆ < q∗ even as β → γ.
If θ = 1, u′(qˆ) = 1, so they consume the efficient quantity qˆ = q∗. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. We first show that Equation (30) holds. In the type II equilibrium, all
buyers spend all their money in the goods market. Consequently, z(q) = φm and z(qˆ) = φmˆ
hold. The last two equations imply
z(q) = z(qˆ)m/mˆ.(A.9)
Each active buyer exits the secondary bond market with mˆ units of money, whereas an active
seller exits with zero units of money. A passive agent (a seller or a buyer) exits the secondary
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bondmarket withm units of money; thereforeM−1 = (1 − n)πmˆ + nπ × 0 + (1 − π)m. Replac-
ing m = M−1, we get mˆ = M−1/(1 − n). Use mˆ = M−1/(1 − n) and m = M−1 to replace mˆ and
m in (A.9), respectively, to get z(q) = z(qˆ)(1 − n); that is, Equation (30) holds.
We now show that (27)–(29) hold. As argued in the proof of Lemma 1, λbm = 0 and λsb = 0
in any equilibrium. In a type II equilibrium, an active buyer’s bond constraint in the secondary
bond market does not bind, that is, λbb = 0, and a seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond
market binds, that is, λsm > 0. Using these values for the multipliers, the secondary bond market
first-order conditions (17) can be rewritten as follows:
∂Vb2
∂mˆ
= φλb and ∂V
b
2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλb,(A.10)
∂Vs2
∂mˆ
= φλs − λsm and
∂Vs2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλs.(A.11)
Using the previous expressions in (12) and (14), we obtain
λb = δu
′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
+ 1 − δ and ϕλb = 1,(A.12)
λsm = φ(λs − 1) and ϕλs = 1.(A.13)
From (A.13), λsm = φ(λs − 1) = φ( 1ϕ − 1). Note that λsm > 0 implies ϕ < 1.
Expression (27) follows directly from (A.12). As in Lemma 1, use (12) and (14) to write (18)
and (19) as follows:
∂V1
∂m
= πφ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)φ(q) + nφ] ,(A.14)
∂V1
∂b
= πφ[(1 − n)ϕλb + nϕλs] + (1 − π)[(1 − n)φ + nφ].(A.15)
Use the primary bond market first-order conditions (5) to write the previous equations as
follows:
γ
β
= π[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n],(A.16)
ργ
β
= πϕ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + 1 − π.(A.17)
Substituting λb and λs in (A.17) yields ρ = β/γ; that is, Equation (29) holds. Finally, (28)
immediately follows from (A.16). 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The proof that Equation (34) holds in a type III equilibrium follows the
proof that Equation (30) holds in Lemma 2, and is not repeated here.
We next show that Equation (31) holds. An active agent enters the secondary bond market
with a real portfolio φm + ϕφbof money and bonds. As a buyer, he sells all his bonds in the type
III equilibrium, and thus he exits the secondary bond market with a portfolio φmˆ. As a seller,
he sells all his money and thus exits this market with a portfolio ϕφbˆ. Therefore φm + ϕφb = φmˆ
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holds for an active buyer, and φm + ϕφb = ϕφbˆ holds for an active seller. Combining the two
equations yields
mˆ = ϕbˆ.(A.18)
Immediately after the secondary bond market closes, but before the goods market opens, the
stock of money in circulation is in the hands of active buyers and passive agents (sellers and
buyers). Active sellers hold no money at the end of the secondary bond market. Consequently,
M−1 = π(1 − n)mˆ + πn × 0 + (1 − π)m. Eliminatem, usingm = M−1, and rearrange to get
mˆ = M−1
1 − n .(A.19)
The stock of bonds in circulation is in the hands of active sellers and passive agents (sellers
and buyers), whereas active buyers hold no bonds at the end of the secondary bond market.
Thus, the stock of bonds is equal to B−1 = π(1 − n) × 0 + πnbˆ+ (1 − π)b. Since passive agents
do not trade in the secondary bond market, they enter the goods market with the same amount
of bonds they had at the beginning of the period, b = B−1. Use this equation to eliminate b in
the bond stock expression above and get
bˆ = B−1
n
.(A.20)
Replace mˆ and bˆ in (A.18) by using (A.19) and (A.20), respectively. Since the bonds-to-money
ratio is constant over time, we can replace the time t − 1 stock of money and bonds with their
respective initial values. Equation (31) then follows.
Finally, we show that (32) and (33) hold. In any equilibrium, λbm = 0 and λsb = 0. In a type
III equilibrium, a seller’s cash constraint in the secondary bond market binds, that is, λsm > 0,
and a buyer’s bond constraint in the secondary bond market binds; that is, λbb > 0. Using these
multipliers, the secondary bond market first-order conditions (17) become
∂Vb2
∂mˆ
= φλb and ∂V
b
2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλb − λbb,(A.21)
∂Vs2
∂mˆ
= φλs − λsm and
∂Vs2
∂bˆ
= ϕφλs.(A.22)
Using the previous expressions in (12) and (14), we obtain
λb = δu
′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
+ (1 − δ) and λbb = φ
(
ϕλb − 1
)
,(A.23)
λsm = φ(λs − 1) and ϕλs = 1.(A.24)
Like in a type II equilibrium, λsm = φ(λs − 1) = φ( 1ϕ − 1), and since λsm > 0, then ϕ < 1. Unlike
in a type II equilibrium, from (A.21), we find λbb = φ(ϕλb − 1) = φ[ϕ(qˆ) − 1]. Since λbb > 0,
(qˆ) > 1/ϕ, and so (27) does not hold in a type III equilibrium.
Use (12) and (14) to write (18) and (19) as follows:
∂V1
∂m
= πφ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)φ(q) + nφ] ,(A.25)
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∂V1
∂b
= πφ[(1 − n)ϕλb + nϕλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)φ + nφ].(A.26)
Using the primary bond market first-order conditions (5), the previous equations can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
γ
β
= π[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n],(A.27)
ργ
β
= πϕ[(1 − n)λb + nλs] + 1 − π.(A.28)
Substituting λb and λs in (A.27) and (A.28) yields (32) and (33), respectively. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The critical values γL and γH exist and are unique, since (q) is
decreasing in q by assumption. We now show that β ≤ γL ≤ γH < ∞. To do so, first note that
γL satisfies (24), that is,
γL
β
= π + (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n] ,
at the intersection between type I and type II equilibria. Also note that β > γL ⇔ (q) < 1 ⇔
u′(q) < z′(q) implies that passive agents consume more than the efficient quantity, q > q∗. This
is clearly not an equilibrium since they can be better off by reducing consumption, q. Moreover,
β = γL ⇔ (q) = 1 ⇔ u′(q) = z′(q), which means that passive agents consume the efficient
quantity, q = q∗. Finally, β < γL ⇔ (q) > 1 ⇔ u′(q) > z′(q), which is also an equilibrium,
since passive agents would like to consume more but do not have enough money to do so.
Hence, β ≤ γL must hold in any equilibrium. Now, note that γH satisfies (28), that is,
γH
β
= π(qˆ) + (1 − π) [(1 − n)(q) + n] ,
at the intersection between type II and type III equilibria. Also note that γH ↗ ∞ iff qˆ,q ↘ 0.
Since consumed quantities are always strictly positive, then γH < ∞. Finally, note that the only
sequence of equilibria can be types I, II, and III, that is, γL ≤ γH. Thus, we have shown that
β ≤ γL ≤ γH < ∞.
Derivation of γL: The critical value γL is the value of γ such that expressions (24) and (28)
hold simultaneously; that is, such that (qˆ) = 1. Such a value exists and is unique, since we
assume that (q) is decreasing in q.
Derivation of γH: The critical value γH is the value of γ such that Equations (28) and (32) hold
simultaneously; that is, such that (qˆ) = B0M0 1−nn > 1. Again, such a value exists and is unique,
since we assume that (q) is decreasing in q. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. From the buyer’s problem in the secondary bond market, Vb1 (m,b) =
Vb2 (mˆ, bˆ), where mˆ and bˆ are the quantities of money and bonds that maximize V
b
2 . In any
equilibrium, the buyer’s budget constraint (15) holds with equality. Thus, we can use (15) to
eliminate bˆ from Vb2 (mˆ, bˆ) and get
Vb1 (m,b) = Vb2
(
mˆ,
φm + ϕφb− φmˆ
ϕφ
)
.(A.29)
Next, use (4), (10), and (3), to get
Vb1 (m,b) = δ
{
u [q (mˆ)] − φd (mˆ)}+ U(x∗) − x∗ + φmˆ + φT − φm+1
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+ φm + ϕφb− φmˆ
ϕ
− φρb+1 + βV1(m+1,b+1).(A.30)
Note that the buyer’s cash constraint in the goods market binds; that is, d (mˆ) = mˆ. From (2),
T = M− M−1 + ρB− B−1, and the budget constraint in the goods market satisfies mˆφ = z(qˆ)
and mφ = z(q). Furthermore, all agents exit the period with the same amount of money and
bonds; hence m+1 = M and b+1 = B. Using these equalities, we can rewrite (A.30) as follows:
Vb1 (m,b) = δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] + U(x∗) − x∗
−
(
1
ϕ
− 1
)
[z(qˆ) − z(q)] + βV1(m+1,b+1),
where we have used b = B−1 and m = M−1. Another way to write this is
Vb1 (m,b) = δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] + U(x∗) − x∗ − i [z(qˆ) − z(q)] + βV1(m+1,b+1).(A.31)
The active buyer’s period surplus is δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)], but he has to pay interest i = 1
ϕ
− 1 on the
difference z(qˆ) − z(q).
Along the same lines, for a passive agent one can show that
Vb2 (m,b) = δ [u(q) − z(q)] + U(x∗) − x∗ + βV1(m+1,b+1).(A.32)
The difference between (A.31) and (A.32) is
Vb1 (m,b) − Vb2 (m,b) = δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] − δ [u(q) − z(q)] − i [z(qˆ) − z(q)] .(A.33)
We now need to study (A.33) for the different types of equilibria. For the type I equilibrium, ϕ
comes from (23); thus
Vb1 (m,b) − Vb2 (m,b) = 1 ≡ δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] − δ [u(q) − z(q)] > 0,
which is clearly strictly positive, since q < qˆ. For the type II equilibrium, ϕ comes from (27);
thus
2 ≡ δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] − δ [u(q) − z(q)] − δ
[
u′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
− 1
]
[z(qˆ) − z(q)] .(A.34)
For the type III equilibrium, ϕ comes from (31); thus
3 ≡ δ [u(qˆ) − z(qˆ)] − δ [u(q) − z(q)] −
(
B0
M0
1 − n
n
− 1
)
[z(qˆ) − z(q)] .
Note that in the type III equilibriumwe have δ u
′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ) + 1 − δ ≥ 1ϕ = B0M0 1−nn . Accordingly,3 ≥ 2.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that 2 > 0. To do so, rewrite (A.34) as follows:
u(qˆ) − u(q) − z(qˆ) + z(q) >
[
u′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
− 1
]
[z(qˆ) − z(q)] .
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Divide both sides of the above inequality by qˆ − q and rearrange it to get
u(qˆ) − u(q)
qˆ − q
z(qˆ) − z(q)
qˆ − q
>
u′(qˆ)
z′(qˆ)
.
The left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side, since we have assumed that u
′(q)
z′(q) is a strictly
decreasing function of q. Hence, 3 ≥ 2 > 0. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5. From an active seller’s decision problem in the secondary bond market,
Vs1(m,b) = Vs2(mˆ, bˆ). In any equilibrium, the seller’s budget constraint (15) holds with equality.
Thus, we can use (15) to eliminate bˆ from Vs2(mˆ, bˆ) and get
Vs1 (m,b) = Vs2
(
φmˆ,
φm + ϕφb− φmˆ
ϕφ
)
.(A.35)
Using (13), the following holds:
Vs1 (m,b) = δs [−c(q) + φd] + V3
(
mˆ,
φm + ϕφb− φmˆ
ϕφ
)
,
which can be rewritten as follows:
Vs1 (m,b) = δs [−c(q) + φd] + U(x∗) − x∗ + φmˆ +
φm + ϕφb− φmˆ
ϕ
+ φT − φm+1 − φρb+1 + βV1(m+1,b+1),
by virtue of (3) and (4).
For a passive seller, one can show that
Vs2 (m,b) = δs [−c(q) + φd] + U(x∗) − x∗ + φm + φb
+ φT − φm+1 − φρb+1 + βV1(m+1,b+1).
Hence the difference Vs1 (m,b) − Vs2 (m,b) is equal to
Vs1 (m,b) − Vs2 (m,b) = φmˆ − φm +
φm − φmˆ
ϕ
= i (φm − φmˆ) .
Note that active sellers do not carry any money into the goods market; thus φmˆ = 0. Also note
that φm = z(q) > 0. It turns out that the above difference is positive if i > 0. 
B. Other Pricing Mechanisms. Here, we discuss how the key equations change when we
assume one of the other pricing mechanisms mentioned earlier. Using the Kalai bargaining
solution is straightforward. Competitive pricing is a bit more involved.
B.1. Kalai bargaining. The Nash bargaining solution is nonmonotonic (see Aruoba et al.,
2007). In contrast, the Kalai bargaining solution, also referred to as proportional bargaining
(Kalai, 1977), is monotonic, and because of this property, it is increasingly used in monetary
economics.26 It can be formalized as follows:
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(q,d) = argmax u(q) − φd
s.t. u(q) − φd = θ [u(q) − c(q)] and d ≤ m.
When the buyer’s cash constraint is binding, the solution is d = m and
φm = zK(q) ≡ θc(q) + (1 − θ)u(q),(A.36)
where the superscript K refers to Kalai bargaining. When the buyer’s constraint (7) is binding,
the Kalai bargaining solution differs from the Nash bargaining solution unless θ = 0 or θ =
1. When the constraint is nonbinding, Nash bargaining and Kalai bargaining yield the same
solution.
It is straightforward to study the model under Kalai bargaining. One only needs to replace
z(q) with zK(q) in Lemmas 1–3.
B.2.Competitive pricing. Competitive pricing differs from randommatching and bargaining
along two dimensions. Obviously, there is no randommatching, meaning that agents trade with
certainty, since in competitive equilibrium buyers and sellers trade against the market. Tomake
the results comparable, however, we assume that buyers and sellers can enter the goods market
only probabilistically with probability δ and δs, respectively. The benefit of this assumption is
that all differences in results are due to the pricing mechanism, since the number of trades is
equal under all pricing protocols.
The second difference is that there is no bargaining; instead, the competitive price adjusts to
equate aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The market clearing condition for the goods
market is
δ(1 − n)[πqˆ + (1 − π)q] = δsnqs,(A.37)
where qˆ (q) is the quantity consumed by a buyer who has (no) access to the secondary bond
market.
Below, we show that competitive pricing yields the same allocation as random matching and
bargaining if the buyers have all the bargaining power; that is, θ = 1. In particular, the terms of
trade satisfy27
zC(q) ≡ q.(A.38)
It is then straightforward to study the model under competitive pricing. One only needs to
replace z(q) with zC(q) in Lemmas 1–3.
Under competitive pricing, it is natural to interpret δ and δs as participation probabilities in
the goods market. In particular, let δ (δs) be the probability that a buyer (seller) participates in
the goods market. Then the buyer’s value function in the goods market is
Vb2 (m,b) = δmaxq
[
u(q) + V3 (m − pq,b)
s.t. m ≥ pq.
]
+ (1 − δ)V3(m,b),(A.39)
where p is the price and q the quantity ofmarket-2 goods consumed by the buyer. The first-order
condition to this problem is
u′(q) = p (φ + λq) ,(A.40)
26 The Kalai bargaining solution is discussed in Aruoba et al. (2007) and is used, for example, in Rocheteau and
Wright (2013), Lester et al. (2012), He et al. (2012), and Trejos and Wright (2012). For a textbook treatment of the
Kalai bargaining solution, see Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
27 In general, the condition is zC(qs,q) ≡ c′(qs)q, where qs is a seller’s production. With a linear cost function,
c(qs) = qs, the condition reduces to zC(q) ≡ q.
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TABLE A.1
DATA SOURCE
Description Identifier Source Period Frequency
AAA Moody’s corporate bond AAA BGFRS 60:Q1-10:Q4 Quarterly
Consumer price index CPIAUCSL BLS 60:Q1-10:Q4 Quarterly
Government bond − three months USGG3M Bloomberg 60:Q1-10:Q4 Quarterly
U.S. total public debt GFDEBTN FMS 66:Q1−10:Q4 Quarterly
M1 money stock M1NS BGFRS 60:Q1−10:Q4 Quarterly
Nominal GDP GDP BEA 60:Q1−10:Q4 Quarterly
Velocity of money M1V FRBSL 60:Q1−10:Q4 Quarterly
where λq is the Lagrange multiplier on m ≥ pq.
The seller’s value function in the goods market is
Vs2(m,b) = δs maxqs [−c (qs) + V3 (m + pqs,b)] + (1 − δ
s)V3(m,b).(A.41)
The first-order condition to this problem is
pφ = c′ (qs) .(A.42)
If the buyer’s cash constraint is not binding, the buyer consumes the efficient quantity q∗, where
q∗ solves u′(q) = c′ (qs). If the cash constraint is binding, then he spends all his money on goods
purchases, and consumption is inefficiently low. Note that, in equilibrium, an active buyer will
hold more money than a passive buyer. This means that λq > λˆq. It then follows that qˆ > q.
The buyer’s envelope conditions are
∂Vb2
∂m
= φδu
′(q)
c′(q)
+ (1 − δ)φ and ∂V
b
2
∂b
= φ,(A.43)
where we have used the envelope conditions in the primary bond market and the first-order
conditions in the goods market. Notice the similarity between (A.43) and (12). The two ex-
pressions are the same if θ = 1. As a consequence of this, active buyers consume the efficient
quantity in a type I equilibrium under competitive pricing, whereas they do not under bilateral
matching unless θ = 1.
The seller’s envelope conditions are exactly the same as (14); that is, ∂V
s
2
∂m =
∂Vs2
∂b = φ.
Finally, by using the budget constraint of the buyer at equality pq = m and (A.42) we get
φm = zC(q) ≡ c′ (qs)q,
which is equal to (A.38) for a linear cost function.
C. Data Sources (Table A.1). The data we use for the calibration is provided by the U.S.
Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (BGFRS), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRBSL), the
U.S. Department of the Treasury: Financial Management Service (FMS), the U.S. Department
of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and Bloomberg.
As the total public debt series from the U.S. Department of the Treasury: Financial Man-
agement Service is only available from 1966:Q1, we construct the quarterly data in the
period from 1960:Q1 to 1965:Q4 with the data provided by http://www.treasurydirect.gov/
govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm. The definition of quarterly data that we apply is in line with
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the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FREDR© database and defined as the average of the
monthly data.28
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